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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
R A N D A L L F R A N K MARK, \ 
Appellant, J 
vs
- f Case No. 
T A M R A J E A N HANCOCK MARK, 
and J A N I S P E C K HANCOCK, \ 
Respondent. J 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
S T A T E M E N T OF T H E K I N D OF CASE 
This is an action commenced by the Appellant to 
obtain custody of the minor child of the parties. The 
parties had previously been divorced in the State of 
Alabama, which Court temporarily deprived both 
parties of custody of the minor child and awarded 
temporary custody to Respondent's stepmother. 
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D I S P O S I T I O N I N L O W E R COURT 
The Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S. 
S a way a presiding, entered its order which, among other 
things, provided that the Respondent, the natural 
mother of the minor child, be awarded the permanent 
care, custody and control of the minor child of the 
parties. 
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L 
The Respondent seeks to have this Court affirm 
the judgment of the District Court. 
S T A T E M E N T O F F A C T S 
The Respondent accepts the Statement of Facts 
set forth in Appellant's Brief on pages 2 and 3 with 
the additional facts that are set forth in the Arguments 
hereinafter contained in Respondent's Brief. 
A R G U M E N T 
P O I N T I 
T H I S COURT S H O U L D V I E W T H E R E -
CORD I N A L I G H T MOST F A V O R A B L E TO 
T H E R E S P O N D E N T . 
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I n an equitable action such as a child custody case 
the U tah Supreme Court has long held that it will not 
overturn the judgment of the trial court except where 
the trial court's finding is against the clear prepond-
erance of the evidence, Graziano v. Graziano, 7 U . 2d 
181, 321 P . 2d 931 (1958), or where the trial court has 
committed a clear abuse of discretion, Wilson v. Wilson, 
5 U . 2d 79, 84, 296 P . 2d 977 (1956). 
This Court has recognized the ability of the trial 
court to be better equipped to handle the problems in 
equity cases as is presently before the Court. I n Hyde 
v. Hyde, 22 U . 2d 429, 454 P . 2d 884 (1960), a case 
involving the grant ing of a divorce and custody of a 
minor child, the Court stated at p . 430: 
". . . the trial judge, was in a much better posi-
tion to determine the question of fitness of the 
parties to have custody than are we who are lim-
ited to the reading of the record. H e had the 
advantage of observing the behavior of the 
parties and could, therefore, better judge the 
emotional stability of each than we can." (See 
also, Steiger v. Steiger, 4 U . 2d 273, 293 P . 2d 
418 (1956). 
The trial court has not abused its discretion in this 
case. The Appellant has not proven that he would be 
more fit than the natural mother to better take care of 
the minor child. The trial court, observing the demeanor 
of the parties involved, properly found from the evid-
ence in favor of the natural mother. 
3 
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P O I N T I I 
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT P R O P E R L Y 
A W A R D E D CUSTODY O F T H E MINOR 
C H I L D TO T H E R E S P O N D E N T . 
Under U.C.A., Sec. 30-3-10, prior to the 1969 
amendment, the natural mother was given the custody 
of the children and the husband had an extreme burden 
to prove that she was unfit to have them. Though the 
degree of burden of proof has been changed when the 
statute was amended, the presumption is still retained 
"that the mother is best suited to care for young chil-
dren". U.C.A. Sec. 30-3-10 (Supp. 1971). 
The trial court found that the best interests of the 
child were to place the child with the mother. The 
Court further determined the mother to be a fit and 
proper person to be awarded the custody of the child 
and that the Appellant had not overcome the statutory 
presumption. 
In Dearden v. Dearden, 15 U. 2d 105, 388 P . 2d 
230 (1964) the Court held that there was a "universally 
recognized presumption that it is for the best interests 
and welfare of a child of such tender years to be with 
her mother". 15 U. 2d at p. 108. The Court further 
stated, at p. 108-109: 
"The mother's right to custody should not be 
denied unless it is shown that she is such an 
immoral, incompetent or otherwise improper per-
son that it would be contrary to the child's best 
interest and welfare to be in her custody." (See 
aslo, White v. White, 29 Utah 2d 148, 506 P . 2d 
4 
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69 (1973), and Baker v. Baker, 25 Utah 2d 337, 
481 P . 2d 672 (1971). 
The Court made these statements and it further 
stated "that in custody matters the paramount consid-
eration is the welfare of the child". (Dearden, supra, 
at p. 106.) 
The Court has thus held that awarding the minor 
child to the natural mother is in the best interests of 
the child, for it is the natural thing to do when all 
factors are equal. 
The evidence given at the trial court shows the 
natural mother to be a good housekeeper (T. 184), as 
well as a loving, caring mother for her child. When the 
child is not with the mother it is cared for by the moth-
er's stepmother or maternal great grandmother, both 
of whom are good housekeepers (T. 129) and are fit 
and capable to take care of the child. The child has 
been placed in a day care center three times and a few 
times with a baby sitter, but in today's society such 
actions are commonplace and perfectly acceptable by 
all norms of society. 
The father of the child must leave the child with 
his parents while he is away to school or out on a 
"date". If the father's parents were unavailable, it is 
easy to assume that the father would also have to leave 
the child with a sitter whenever he is unable to be with 
the minor child. 
The Appellant has been to a psychiatrist on diff-
erent occasions to discern his abnormalities. While in 
5 
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the Air Force the Appellant had his gun taken away 
because of his emotional instability (T. 151). The Ap-
pellant has made obscene phone calls to the Respondent 
while she has been at work (T. 161). The Appellant 
has threatened the Respondent (T. 163-65). The Ap-
pellant has on numerous occasions refused to give up 
custody of the minor child when he knew the child was 
to be given to the Respondent (T. 165-66, 173). The 
Appellant has done everything in his power to emo-
tionally harm and upset the Respondent. Even the 
testimony given by the psychiatrist, who had made his 
entire evaluation by meeting the Appellant only once 
and for only one hour, when presented with additional 
facts as to the Appellant's background and actions, 
such as the bizarre and totally abnormal letter writing 
(Exhibits 12-D, 16-D, 17-D, 18-D, 19-D and 20-D), 
stated that his observations as to the Appellant may not 
be correct. The doctor said, upon receiving the addi-
tional evidence, "it's an area of less adequate perform-
ance than that demonstrated in my office". (T. 154). 
Since the evaluation was exteremely brief and with-
out background information, the opinions of the psy-
chiatrist are valuable only to one specific situation 
where he observed the Appellant and the minor child. 
The evaluation is thus lacking any substantial 
value upon which a realistic relationship between the 
father and the child can be shown. The father has not, 
by his own actions, proven himself to be emotionally 
secure or mature enough to handle the life of the minor 
child. 
6 
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I n the case of I lytic (supra > fh ••••' 
" I n holding tn.u uw Uh/Uiu ua.^ ui. *• — 1 
proper person to have the care, eustodv and v .-n 
trol of the child, the Court did not mean that «1H 
was morally unfit. H e simply meant that her 
emotional state was such that she eonld not give 
that care a?id secuiifv [n ilu *»'Id . . 
The lower court, oeing able to j udge the emotional 
stability and behavior of the parties, found the mother 
in this ease to be the better person to take care of the 
infant's life. The threats and harassments by the A p -
pellant to the mother have caused a slight nervousness 
in the Respondent, yet the test set forth .?- Hyde 
(supra) has not been even partially met by the Re-
spondent, The mother is emotionally fit and capable of 
caring for I lie child. The father's actions warrant close 
senf>h\v j . » his emotional stability and maturity 
The Appellant has not ,n -u,, in.-u the Respondent 
is not best suited to care for the minor child. The A p -
pellant did show dial the Respondent knew individuals 
who have used drugs, yet so does the Appellant. The 
Appel lant has failed to overcome H hngnage of 
IXC,A. Sec. 30-3-10 / Supp. 1971) 
File paramount consideration for :!;*• (/omt *• ,.„ 
best interests of the child and Uu ti i < • ur t. when 
faced with the evidence of Appellant ^ sf range letter 
writing, properly concluded that in nrotecting the child, 
custody should be placed with -'•• Respondent. 
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P O I N T I I I 
T H E D I S T R I C T COURT A C T E D P R O P -
E R L Y W I T H I N I T S D I S C R E T I O N I N D E N Y -
N G T H E R E Q U E S T F O R A CUSTODY E V A L -
U A T I O N . 
The Appellant would have this Court believe that 
in every case wherein there is a contest for custody of 
a child of tender years, that the trial court must order 
the custody evaluation pursuant to the Family Court 
Act, U.C.A. Sec. 30-3-11.1 et. seq. 
The Family Court Act was enacted by the Legis-
lature in 1969 and its purpose is set forth in 30-3-11.1 
U.C.A. (1953, as amended). I ts purpose is stated as 
follows: 
" I t is the public policy of the State of Utah to 
strengthen the family life foundation of our so-
ciety and reduce the social and economic cost to 
the State resulting from broken homes and to 
take reasonable measures to preserve marriages, 
particularly where minor children are involved. 
The purposes of this Act are to protect the rights 
of children and to promote the public welfare by 
preserving and protecting family life and the in-
stitution of matrimony by providing the Courts 
with further assistance for family counseling, the 
reconciliation of spouses and amicable settlement 
of domestic and family controversy." 
I t is clear from a reading of this section that the 
Family Court Act does not apply in the instant case 
where there is not before the Court any attempt to 
preserve the marriage between Appellant and Respon-
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dent nor is there any need to preserve and protect the 
family life or the institution of matrimony. 
The Family Court Act specifically applies where 
there is pending before the Court a divorce action which 
through the use of counseling and evaluations, the 
Court, the parties and their respective counsel can seek 
to attempt a reconciliation and thus preserve the mar-
riage. 
In the instant case the parties had been divorced 
in the State of Alabama prior to the institution of this 
action by the Appellant and thus the Family Court 
Act would not apply. 
The trial court had wide discretion in seeking to 
determine what is in the best interest of the minor child 
in a case such as the one at bar and within this discre-
tion the Court may or may not require certain things 
of the parties before making its determination. 
In the instant case the Appellant wanted a stipu-
lated to custody evaluation. The Respondent refused 
to stipulate to this and the Court, in respecting this 
refusal, denied the custody evaluation and determined 
that the Court could, on its own, hear the evidence of 
the parties and determine with whom custody of the 
child should be placed. There is no statutory law or 
case law which would require a trial court to compel 
either one or both of the parties to submit to a custody 
evaluation in a case wherein the Family Court Act does 
not apply. 
The Appellant has set forth nothing in his brief 
9 
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which would show that a trial court abused its descreion 
in denying the request for a custody evaluation and 
unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion and 
determination of the trial court should not be disturbed 
on appeal. Wilson v. Wilson (supra), and Graziano v. 
Graziano (supra). 
P O I N T IV 
T H E T R I A L COURT D I D NOT A B U S E 
I T S D I S C R E T I O N I N D E N Y I N G A P P E L -
L A N T ' S MOTION F O R A N E W T R I A L . 
The Appellant filed with the trial court on May 6, 
1974, a document entitled "Motion for Rehearing" (R. 
9). This Motion for Rehearing was considered by the 
trial court to be in effect a Motion for a New Trial. 
Motions for a New Trial are governed by Rule 59, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and this rule must be 
complied with before a party is entitled to be awarded 
a new trial. 
The motion which Appellant made appears to be 
based upon Rule 59(a) (4), to-wit: "alleged newly 
discovered evidence. The trial court concluded that the 
newly discovered evidence "was not sufficient evidence 
to justify a new trial" (R. 8). 
The trial court has very wide discretion in grant-
ing or denying motions for a new trial; Uptown Appli-
ance and Radio Company, Inc. v. Flint, 122 U. 298, 
249 P . 2d 826 (1952) ; and this discretion will not be 
10 
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overturned unless there is a showing of a clear abuse 
of discretion on the part of the trial court. Jones Manu-
facturing Company v. Wilson, 15 U. 2d 210, 390 P . 2d 
127 (1964); and Crellin v. Thomas, 122 U. 122, 247 P . 
2d 264 (1952). 
The Appellant, in his brief, has not set forth any 
basis upon which this Court could conclude that the 
trial court abused its discretion in denying the Motion 
for a New Trial. 
The Appellant, in his brief at page 17, engages in 
some speculation that because the Respondent and her 
companions were arrested at 7:00 a.m. in the morning 
this shows Respondent is immoral and that it could be 
assumed that she was arrested some time earlier to that. 
The Appellant proffered no further evidence to the trial 
court in support of its motion other than that the Re-
spondent had been arrested in the company of other 
persons. The trial court concluded that this evidence 
was not sufficient to overcome the determination of the 
Court that the best interests of the child would best be 
suited by placing the child with the Respondent. This 
decision of the Court is justified in light of the evidence 
adduced at the time of the hearing in this matter with 
regards to the emotional instability of the Appellant. 
There is one other ground upon which the trial 
court could have denied the Motion for a New Trial, 
and that is Rule 59(c), which requires that a Motion 
for a New Trial shall be supported by affidavit when 
the grounds include alleged newly discovered evidence. 
11 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
There is nothing in the record before this Court which 
shows that the Appellant filed with his motion the re-
quired affidavit. 
CONCLUSION 
The Respondent submits that the judgment of the 
District Court should be affirmed on the basis that the 
Court, after hearing all of the evidence, properly con-
cloded that it would be in the best interests of the minor 
child to be placed with his mother, the Respondent 
herein. 
Further, the trial court did not abuse its discretion 
in denying the Appellant's request for a custody evalu-
ation or in denying Appellant's Motion for a New 
Trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
L A U R E N N. B E A S L E Y 
Attorney for Respondent 
Suite 430, Judge Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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